NJ 1998/506
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EUROPEES HOF VOOR DE RECHTEN VAN DE MENS
25 juni 1997
(Bernhardt, Pettiti, Russo, Spielmann, Foighel, Morenilla, Freeland, Lopes
Rocha, Kûris; m.nt. PJB)
ECHR Reports 1997-III, p. 1004

EVRM art. 8, 13, 50; Interception of Communications Act 1985

[Essentie] Recht op privacy kan zich mede uitstrekken tot de werkplek.
"Reasonable expectation of privacy". Waarschijnlijkheid dat telefoongesprekken
gevoerd vanaf de werkplek zijn afgeluisterd; "interference by a public
authority". Nu het nationale Engelse recht geen bepalingen bevat met betrekking
tot het afluisteren van telecommunicatie via het interne (politiële)
telecommunicatienetwerk kan niet gezegd worden dat de inbreuk bij de wet was
voorzien ("in accordance with the law"). Schending art. 8 EVRM. Afwezigheid van
nationaal rechtsmiddel om tegen beweerdelijke schending van art. 8 op te komen.
Schending art. 13.
Het recht op privacy en het recht van correspondentie strekt zich mede uit tot
telefoongesprekken gevoerd vanaf de werkplek (§ 44). Nu niet blijkt dat
klaagster was gewaarschuwd dat gesprekken gevoerd over het interne
communicatiesysteem zouden kunnen worden afgeluisterd had zij een "reasonable
expectation of privacy". Dit is temeer het geval, nu ze als Assistant Chief
Constable de beschikking had over twee telefoons, waarvan er één specifiek
bestemd was voor privé-gebruik. Daarnaast had ze de verzekering gekregen dat zij
de telefoons mocht gebruiken in relatie tot de sexe discriminatie-zaak die zij
aanhangig had gemaakt (§ 45). Art. 8 is van toepassing (§ 46).
Het voorhanden zijnde bewijs rechtvaardigt de conclusie dat het waarschijnlijk
is dat telefoongesprekken door klaagster gevoerd vanaf haar werkplek zijn
afgeluisterd met als belangrijkste doel bewijs te vergaren dat tegen haar zou
kunnen worden gebruikt in de door klaagster aanhangig gemaakte procedure. Dit
betekent dat er sprake was van een "interference by a public authority" in de
zin van art. 8 lid 2 (§ 48).
Art. 8 lid 2 vereist dat het nationale recht voldoende duidelijkheid verschaft
omtrent de omstandigheden waarin en de voorwaarden waaronder de overheid tot
geheime inmenging mag overgaan (§ 49). De Interception of Telecommunications Act
1985 heeft geen betrekking op interne communicatiesystemen van overheden.
Daarnaast kent het nationale Engelse recht geen bepalingen die daarop van
toepassing zijn. Als gevolg daarvan kan niet worden gezegd dat de inbreuk bij de
wet was voorzien. Schending art. 8 (§ 51).
Anders dan in de zaak van Klass and Others (AA 1979, p. 327) is de essentie van
de klacht dat telefoongesprekken vanuit klaagsters huis zijn afgeluisterd niet
dat haar rechten zoals genoemd in art. 8 werden bedreigd door het enkele bestaan
van regelgeving en toegestane praktijk van geheime observatie, maar dat
dergelijke maatregelen daadwerkelijk jegens haar zijn toegepast, alsook dat die
maatregelen onwettig waren onder the Interception of Telecommunications Act
1985. In deze omstandigheden zal het Hof ervan overtuigd moeten raken dat er een
"reasonable likelihood" is dat dergelijke maatregelen inderdaad jegens haar zijn
toegepast (§ 57). Het enige bewijs voor die stelling is informatie van een
anonieme bron (§ 59). Niet gezegd kan daarom worden dat is vastgesteld dat er
sprake was van een inbreuk op klaagsters rechten. Geen schending art. 8 (§ 60).
Art. 13 vereist dat het nationale recht voorziet in een rechtsmiddel met
betrekking tot "arguable" claims (§ 64). Klaagster had zonder twijfel een
zodanige claim waar het gaat om het afluisteren van de telefoongesprekken
gevoerd vanaf haar werkplek. Als gevolg daarvan was zij gerechtigd tot een
effectief nationaal rechtsmiddel. Zodanig rechtsmiddel was echter afwezig, nu
regelgeving ontbrak. Schending art. 13 (§ 65). Geen schending art. 13 waar het
betreft het afluisteren van klaagsters telefoongesprekken gevoerd vanuit haar
huis, nu afdoende bewijs daartoe ontbreekt; claim is niet "arguable" (§ 69-70).
Het Hof acht het niet nodig de klacht dat art. 10 en 14 zijn geschonden
afzonderlijk te onderzoeken (§ 72).
Voor ogen houdend dat het afluisteren van telefoongesprekken gevoerd vanaf
klaagsters werkplek primair tot doel had bewijs te vergaren tegen haar, meent
het Hof dat er sprake is geweest van een ernstige inbreuk op haar rechten. Nu er
echter anderzijds geen bewijs is dat de door klaagster ondervonden stress direct
gerelateerd was aan het afluisteren van haar gesprekken, wordt aan klaagster £
10 000 schadevergoeding toegekend voor immateriële schade (§ 76).

[Tekst] Halford,
tegen
Verenigd Koninkrijk.
Feiten
Klaagster is Mw. Halford. Van 1962 tot haar pensioen in 1992 was zij werkzaam
bij de Engelse politie. In mei 1983 wordt Mw. Halford benoemd tot Assistant
Chief Constable bij de Merseyside Police. Als zodanig is ze de meest hoog
geplaatste vrouwelijke agente binnen het Verenigd Koninkrijk. In de daarop
volgende zeven jaar solliciteert Mw. Halford zonder succes acht maal op de
positie van Deputy Chief Constable. De weigering van de Home Office om met deze
promotie in te stemmen is volgens klaagster het gevolg van de negatieve
aanbevelingen van de Chief Constable van de Merseyside Police, die bezwaar maakt
tegen haar betrokkenheid bij de strijd voor gelijke behandeling van mannen en
vrouwen.
Nadat haar in februari 1990 opnieuw promotie is geweigerd maakt Mw. Halford op 4
juni 1990 een gerechtelijke procedure aanhangig bij het Industrial Tribunal. In
die procedure stelt zij dat er sprake is van discriminatie op basis van sexe.
Gedaagden zijn de Chief Constable van Merseyside en de Home Secretary.
Op 14 juni 1990 worden de voorzitter en de vice-voorzitter van de politiële
autoriteiten van Merseyside aangewezen om als "Special Committee" kwesties
verband houdend met de discriminatie-zaak te behandelen.
Mw. Halford stelt dat leden van de Merseyside politiële autoriteiten naar
aanleiding van haar klacht bij het Industrial Tribunal een campagne tegen haar
zijn begonnen, hetgeen zich onder andere uit in het "lekken" van informatie naar
de pers, het afluisteren van haar telefoon (zie infra), en het besluit
disciplinaire procedures tegen haar te starten.
Op 14 sept. 1990 dient het Special Committee een rapport in bij het Senior
Officers' Disciplinary Committee, waarin de Chief Constable melding maakt van
een beweerdelijk incident van misdraging door Mw. Halford op 24 juli 1990. Op 20
sept. 1990 besluit het Disciplinary Committee een formeel onderzoek te starten
naar Mw. Halford. Op 12 dec. 1990 wordt zij geschorst. Twee maanden later wordt
door de Police Complaints Authority besloten haar tuchtrechtelijk te vervolgen.
Mw. Halford vecht deze beslissing aan bij de High Court, die in september 1991
de zaak schorst in het licht van een mogelijk te treffen schikking tussen
partijen. Omdat de partijen niet tot een vergelijk kunnen komen, komt de zaak in
december 1991 opnieuw voor de High Court. Dit gerecht bepaalt vervolgens dat de
voorzitter en vice-voorzitter van de politiële autoriteiten zich buiten hun
bevoegdheden hebben begeven en dat Mw. Halford niet geheel eerlijk is behandeld.
De relevante beslissingen worden door de rechter vernietigd. In juni 1992 vindt
er een hoorzitting plaats in het Industrial Tribunal. Korte tijd later komen
partijen alsnog tot een schikking. Mw. Halford ontvangt ex gratia een bedrag van
£ 10 000 van de zijde van de politie (het maximale bedrag dat het Industrial
Tribunal haar zou kunnen toekennen), alsmede een bedrag van £ 5000 van de Home
Secretary. Bij de regeling wordt voorts overeengekomen dat Mw. Halford de
politie om medische redenen (een knieblessure in 1989) vroegtijdig zal verlaten.
Daarnaast stemt de Home Office erin toe een aantal voorstellen te doen aan de
Commissie Gelijke Behandeling, waaronder voorstellen om de selectieprocedures
voor seniore posities binnen de politie te herzien.
De beweerdelijke afluisterincidenten
Als Assistent Chief Constable heeft Mw. Halford de beschikking over een eigen
kantoor en twee telefoons, waarvan er één voor privé-gebruik bestemd is. Deze
telefoons zijn onderdeel van het interne telefonische netwerk van de Merseyside
Police. Als zodanig zijn deze telefoons aldus geen onderdeel van het publieke
netwerk. Mw. Halford krijgt geen beperkingen opgelegd met betrekking tot het
gebruik van beide telefoons, noch wordt haar enige vorm van informatie gegeven
voor het gebruik daarvan, anders dan de bevestiging van de Chief Constable dat
zij toestemming heeft de zaak in het Industrial Tribunal telefonisch of
anderszins te volgen terwijl zij in functie is. Daarnaast wordt een belangrijk
deel van de telefoonrekening van haar huistelefoon betaald door de Merseyside
Police, gezien het feit dat ze regelmatig "on call" is. Die telefoon is via het
"network termination point" verbonden met het publieke telecommunicatie-netwerk.
Mw. Halford beweert dat gesprekken gevoerd vanuit haar huis en kantoor door de
politie zijn afgeluisterd om informatie te verkrijgen die tegen haar zou kunnen
worden gebruikt in de discriminatie-zaak. Haar vermoeden wordt op 16 april 1991
door een anonieme bron bevestigd. Deze vertelt haar dat hij heeft ontdekt dat de
Merseyside politie transcripties van conversaties gevoerd via klaagsters
huistelefoon aan een onderzoek onderwerpt.
Op 17 juni 1992 kaart Mw. Halford deze kwestie aan bij het Industrial Tribunal.
De advocaat van de Home Secretary stelt echter dat het haar niet mogelijk is
bewijs voor die stelling te introduceren, daar sectie 9 van de Interception of
Communications Act 1985 ("the 1985 Act") uitdrukkelijk uitsluit dat bewijs wordt
geïntroduceerd voor een gerecht of tribunaal hetwelk suggereert dat een
overtreding onder sectie 1 van die wet is begaan door een overheidsdienaar. Op 6
dec. 1991 verzoekt Mw. Halford het Interception of Communications Tribunal om
een onderzoek onder sectie 7 van de 1985 Act. Twee maanden later bericht het
tribunaal haar dat onderzoek heeft uitgewezen dat er geen overtreding van de
secties 2 tot en met 5 van de 1985 Act heeft plaatsgevonden. In maart 1992
bevestigt het tribunaal dat zij niet kan specificeren of klaagsters telefoon
inderdaad afgeluisterd is.
The Interception of Communications Act 1985
De Interception of Communications Act 1985 is het gevolg van de uitspraak van
het Europese Hof voor de rechten van de mens in Malone v. the United Kingdom (2
August 1984, Series A no. 82 (NJ 1988, 534, m.nt. P. van Dijk; red.)). In sectie
1 van deze wet is bepaald dat "anyone who intentionally intercepts a
communication in the course of its transmission by means of a public
communications system" zich schuldig maakt aan een strafbaar feit. Sectie 1 (2)
en (3) bepalen dat van zodanig strafbaar feit geen sprake is in de daar genoemde
omstandigheden. Relevant voor de onderhavige zaak is alleen de onderschepping
van telecommunicatie op basis van een machtiging afgegeven door de Secretary of
State onder sectie 2 van dezelfde wet. Deze sectie bepaalt onder meer dat
    "The Secretary of State shall not issue a warrant ... unless he considers
    that the warrant is necessary
    (a) in the interest of national security;
    (b) for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime; or
    (c) for the purposes of safeguarding the economic well-being of the United
    Kingdom."
Daarnaast bepaalt sectie 2 dat de Secretary of State zich rekenschap moet geven
van de vraag of de benodigde informatie ook in redelijkheid op andere wijze kan
worden verkregen. De machtiging dient te specificeren wie bevoegd is de
communicatie af te luisteren, alsook van welke plaats de communicatie zal worden
gevoerd en welke personen daarbij betrokken zijn. In sectie 9 van voornoemde wet
is bepaald dat geen bewijs kan worden geïntroduceerd bij een gerecht of
tribunaal hetwelk suggereert dat ofwel de overtreding van sectie 1 is begaan
door een overheidsdienaar, ofwel dat aan deze persoon een machtiging onder
sectie 2 is afgegeven.
Tevens voorziet de wet in een Interception of Communications Tribunal, die op
klacht van een ieder gerechtigd is te onderzoeken of een machtiging is afgegeven
om de betreffende communicatie af te luisteren, en zo ja, of deze machtiging
mocht worden afgegeven onder de 1985 Act. Wanneer het tribunaal vaststelt dat
geen schending heeft plaatsgevonden informeert het de klager in die zin. Het
tribunaal is echter niet bevoegd te bevestigen dat er geen schending heeft
plaatsgevonden omdat geen communicatie is onderschept, of omdat er wel
afgeluisterd is, maar dit bevoegd gebeurde onder de 1985 Act. Indien het
tribunaal vaststelt dat een schending heeft plaatsgevonden, is het verplicht dit
te rapporteren aan de Minister-President en bevoegd klager daaromtrent te
informeren. Daarnaast heeft het tribunaal de bevoegdheid de machtiging nietig te
verklaren en compensatie toe te kennen aan klager. Een rechtsmiddel kan tegen de
besluiten van het tribunaal niet worden ingesteld.
Daarnaast voorziet de 1985 Act in de mogelijkheid voor de Minister-President een
Commissioner aan te stellen, die onder andere tot taak heeft te onderzoeken op
welke wijze de Secretary of State zijn bevoegdheden onder sectie 2-5 van de wet
uitoefent, en dienaangaande jaarlijks te rapporteren aan de Minister-President.
De 1985 Act richt zich niet tegen telecommunicatie buiten het publieke netwerk
om. Ook overigens is er geen wetgeving die zich richt op het onderscheppen van
communicatie via niet-publieke lijnen. Het Engelse "common law" voorziet niet in
een remedie tegen het afluisteren van telecommunicatie.
Procedure voor de Commissie
Op 22 april 1992 dient Mw. Halford een klacht in bij de Europese Commissie voor
de rechten van de mens in Straatsburg. In haar klacht stelt Mw. Halford (a) dat
het afluisteren van gesprekken gevoerd via de telefoons op haar werkplek en haar
huistelefoon inbreuk maakte op haar recht op een privéleven en haar recht van
meningsuiting zoals neergelegd in respectievelijk art. 8 en 10 Europees Verdrag
tot bescherming van de rechten van de mens en de fundamentele vrijheden (EVRM);
(b) dat er geen effectief nationaal rechtsmiddel bestond in relatie tot het
afluisteren van haar telefoons, zoals vereist in art. 13 EVRM; en (c) dat ze
werd gediscrimineerd op basis van sexe, hetgeen indruist tegen art. 14 EVRM in
relatie tot art. 8 en 10.
Op 2 maart 1995 verklaart de Commissie de klacht ontvankelijk. In haar rapport
van 18 april 1996 komt de Commissie met betrekking tot het afluisteren van
gesprekken gevoerd vanaf Mw. Halfords werkplek met 26 stemmen tegen 1 tot het
oordeel dat de art. 8 en 13 EVRM zijn geschonden. De Commissie is unaniem van
oordeel dat de art. 8, 10 en 13 niet zijn geschonden waar het haar huistelefoon
betreft; dat het niet nodig is de klacht met betrekking tot art. 10 voor wat
betreft de telefoons op haar werkplek te behandelen; en dat er geen schending
van art. 14 heeft plaatsgevonden in samenhang met art. 8 of 10.
De Commissie legt de zaak op 28 mei 1996 voor aan het Hof.
As to the law
I. Alleged violations of Article 8 of the Convention
41. Ms Halford alleged that the interception of her telephone calls amounted to
violations of Article 8 of the Convention, which provides:
    "1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
    home and his correspondence.
    2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
    this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in
    a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or
    the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
    crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
    rights and freedoms of others."
The Commission agreed that there had been a violation so far as the interception
of calls from her office telephones was concerned. The Government denied that
there had been any violation.
A. The office telephones
1. Applicability of Article 8 to the complaint relating to the office telephones
42. The applicant argued and the Commission agreed that conversations made on
the telephones in Ms Halford's office at Merseyside Police Headquarters fell
within the scope of "private life" and "correspondence" in Article 8 § 1, since
the Court in its case-law had adopted a broad construction of these expressions
(see, for example, the Klass and Others v. Germany judgment of 6 September 1978,
Series A no. 28, p. 21, § 41 (AA 1979, p. 327; red.), the Huvig v. France
judgment of 24 April 1990, Series A no. 176-B, p. 41, § 8 and p. 52, § 25 (NJ
1991, 523, m.nt. EJD; red.), the Niemietz v. Germany judgment of 16 December
1992, Series A no. 251-B (NJ 1993, 400, m.nt. EJD; red.) and the A v. France
judgment of 23 November 1993, Series A no. 277-B).
43. The Government submitted that telephone calls made by Ms Halford from her
workplace fell outside the protection of Article 8, because she could have had
no reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to them. At the hearing before
the Court, Counsel for the Government expressed the view that an employer should
in principle, without the prior knowledge of the employee, be able to monitor
calls made by the latter on telephones provided by the employer.
44. In the Court's view, it is clear from its case-law that telephone calls made
from business premises as well as from the home may be covered by the notions of
"private life" and "correspondence" within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 (see the
above-mentioned Klass and Others judgment, loc. cit., the Malone v. the United
Kingdom judgment of 2 August 1985, Series A no. 82, p. 30, § 64 (NJ 1988, 534,
m.nt. P. van Dijk; red.), the above-mentioned Huvig judgment, loc. cit., and
mutatis mutandis the above-mentioned Niemietz judgment, pp. 33-35, §§ 29-33).
45. There is no evidence of any warning having been given to Ms Halford, as a
user of the internal telecommunications system operated at the Merseyside Police
Headquarters, that calls made on that system would be liable to interception.
She would, the Court considers, have had a reasonable expectation of privacy for
such calls, which expectation was moreover reinforced by a number of factors. As
Assistant Chief Constable she had sole use of her office where there were two
telephones, one of which was specifically designated for her private use.
Furthermore, she had been given the assurance, in response to a memorandum, that
she could use her office telephones for the purposes of her sex discrimination
case.
46. For all of the above reasons, the Court concludes that telephone
conversations made by Ms Halford on her office telephones fell within the scope
of the notions of "private life" and "correspondence" and that Article 8 was
therefore applicable to this part of the complaint.
2. Existence of an interference
47. The Government conceded that the applicant had adduced sufficient material
to establish a reasonable likelihood that calls made from her office telephones
had been intercepted. The Commission also considered that an examination of the
application revealed such a reasonable likelihood.
48. The Court agrees. The evidence justifies the conclusion that there was a
reasonable likelihood that calls made by Ms Halford from her office were
intercepted by the Merseyside Police with the primary aim of gathering material
to assist in the defence of the sex discrimination proceedings brought against
them. This interception constituted an "interference by a public authority",
within the meaning of Article 8 § 2, with the exercise of Ms Halford's right to
respect for her private life and correspondence.
3. Whether the interference was "in accordance with the law"
49. Article 8 § 2 further provides that any interference by a public authority
with an individual's right to respect for private life and correspondence must
be "in accordance with the law".
According to the Court's well-established case-law, this expression does not
only necessitate compliance with domestic law, but also relates to the quality
of that law, requiring it to be compatible with the rule of law. In the context
of secret measures of surveillance or interception of communications by public
authorities, because of the lack of public scrutiny and the risk of misuse of
power, the domestic law must provide some protection to the individual against
arbitrary interference with Article 8 rights. Thus, the domestic law must be
sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate indication as to
the circumstances in and conditions on which public authorities are empowered to
resort to any such secret measures (see the above-mentioned Malone judgment, p.
32, § 67, and, mutatis mutandis, the Leander v. Sweden judgment of 26 March
1987, Series A no. 116, p. 23, §§ 50-51 (NJCM-Bull. 1988, 148, m.nt. THLB;
red.)).
50. In the present case, the Government accepted that if, contrary to their
submission, the Court were to conclude that there had been an interference with
the applicant's rights under Article 8 in relation to her office telephones,
such interference was not "in accordance with the law" since domestic law did
not provide any regulation of interceptions of calls made on telecommunications
systems outside the public network.
51. The Court notes that the 1985 Act does not apply to internal communications
systems operated by public authorities, such as that at Merseyside Police
Headquarters, and that there is no other provision in domestic law to regulate
interceptions of telephone calls made on such systems. It cannot therefore be
said that the interference was "in accordance with the law" for the purposes of
Article 8 § 2 of the Convention, since the domestic law did not provide adequate
protection to Ms Halford against interferences by the police with her right to
respect for her private life and correspondence.
It follows that there has been a violation of Article 8 in relation to the
interception of calls made on Ms Halford's office telephones.
B. The home telephone
1. Applicability of Article 8 to the complaint relating to the home telephone
52. It is clear from the Court's case-law (see the citations in paragraph 44
above) that telephone conversations made from the home are covered by the
notions of "private life" and "correspondence" under Article 8 of the
Convention. Indeed, this was not disputed by the Government.
Article 8 is, therefore, applicable to this part of Ms Halford's complaint.
2. Existence of an interference
53. The applicant alleged that calls made from her telephone at home also were
intercepted by the Merseyside Police for the purposes of defending the sex
discrimination proceedings. She referred to the evidence of interception which
she had adduced before the Commission, and to the further specification made to
the Court. In addition she submitted that, contrary to the Commission's
approach, she should not be required to establish that there was a "reasonable
likelihood" that calls made on her home telephone were intercepted. Such a
requirement would be inconsistent with the Court's pronouncement in the
above-mentioned Klass and Others case, that the menace of surveillance could in
itself constitute an interference with Article 8 rights. In the alternative, she
contended that if the Court did require her to show some indication that she had
been affected, the evidence brought by her was satisfactory; given the secrecy
of the alleged measures it would undermine the effectiveness of the protection
afforded by the Convention if the threshold of proof were set too high.
54. The Government explained that they could not disclose whether or not there
had been any interception of calls made from the telephone in Ms Halford's home,
since the finding which the Interception of Communications Tribunal was
empowered to make under the 1985 Act was deliberately required to be couched in
terms which did not reveal whether there had been an interception on a public
telecommunications system properly authorised under the Act or whether there had
in fact been no interception. They could, however, confirm that the Tribunal was
satisfied that there had been no contravention of sections 2 to 5 of the 1985
Act in Ms Halford's case.
55. The Commission, applying its case-law, required the applicant to establish
that there was a "reasonable likelihood" that calls made on her home telephone
had been intercepted (see, for example, the Report of the Commission on
application no. 12175/86, Hewitt and Harman v. the United Kingdom, 9 May 1989,
Decisions and Reports 67, pp. 98-99, §§ 29-32).
Having reviewed all the evidence, it did not find such a likelihood established.
56. The Court recalls that in the above-mentioned Klass and Others case it was
called upon to decide inter alia whether legislation which empowered the
authorities secretly to monitor the correspondence and telephone conversations
of the applicants, who were unable to establish whether such measures had in
fact been applied to them, amounted to an interference with their Article 8
rights. The Court held in that case that "in the mere existence of the
legislation itself there is involved, for all those to whom the legislation
could be applied, a menace of surveillance; this menace necessarily strikes at
freedom of communication between users of the postal and telecommunication
services and thereby constitutes an "interference by a public authority" with
the exercise of the applicants' right to respect for private and family life and
correspondence" (p. 21, § 41).
The Court further recalls that in its above-mentioned Malone judgment, in
addition to finding that one telephone conversation to which the applicant had
been a party had been intercepted at the request of the police under a warrant
issued by the Home Secretary, it observed that "the existence in England and
Wales of laws and practices which permit and establish a system for effecting
secret surveillance of communications amounted in itself to an "interference"
(pp. 30-31, § 64).
57. However, the essence of Ms Halford's complaint, unlike that of the
applicants in the Klass and Others case (cited above, p. 20, § 38), was not that
her Article 8 rights were menaced by the very existence of admitted law and
practice permitting secret surveillance, but instead that measures of
surveillance were actually applied to her. Furthermore, she alleged that the
Merseyside Police intercepted her calls unlawfully, for a purpose unauthorised
by the 1985 Act (see paragraph 53 above).
In these circumstances, since the applicant's complaint concerns specific
measures of telephone interception which fell outside the law, the Court must be
satisfied that there was a reasonable likelihood that some such measure was
applied to her.
58. In this respect the Court notes, first, that the Commission, which under the
Convention system is the organ primarily charged with the establishment and
verification of the facts (see, for example, the Aksoy v. Turkey judgment of 18
December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI, p. 2272, § 38),
considered that the evidence presented to it did not indicate a reasonable
likelihood that calls made on the applicant's home telephone were being
intercepted (see the Report of the Commission, paragraph 65).
59. The Court observes that the only item of evidence which tends to suggest
that calls made from Ms Halford's home telephone, in addition to those made from
her office, were being intercepted, is the information concerning the discovery
of the Merseyside Police checking transcripts of conversations. Before the
Court, the applicant provided more specific details regarding this discovery,
namely that it was made on a date after she had been suspended from duty.
However, the Court notes that this information might be unreliable since its
source has not been named. Furthermore, even if it is assumed to be true, the
fact that the police were discovered checking transcripts of the applicant's
telephone conversations on a date after she had been suspended does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that these were transcripts of conversations
made from her home.
60. The Court, having considered all the evidence, does not find it established
that there was an interference with Ms Halford's rights to respect for her
private life and correspondence in relation to her home telephone.
In view of this conclusion, the Court does not find a violation of Article 8 of
the Convention with regard to telephone calls made from Ms Halford's home.
II. Alleged violation of Article 13 of the Convention
61. Ms Halford further alleged that she had been denied an effictive domestic
remedy for her complaints, in violation of Article 13 of the Convention, which
states:
    "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are
    violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority
    notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in
    an official capacity."
A. The office telephones
62. The applicant, with whom the Commission agreed, contended that there had
been a violation of Article 13 in view of the fact that there was no avenue in
domestic law by which to complain about interceptions of calls made on
telecommunications systems outside the public network.
63. The Government submitted that Article 13 was not applicable in that Ms
Halford had not made out an "arguable claim" to a violation of Articles 8 or 10
of the Convention. In the alternative, they submitted that no separate issue
arose under this provision in relation to the office telephones.
64. The Court recalls that the effect of Article 13 is to require the provision
of a remedy at national level allowing the competent domestic authority both to
deal with the substance of the relevant Convention complaint and to grant
appropriate relief, although Contracting States are afforded some discretion as
to the manner in which they conform to their obligations under this provision
(see the Chahal v. the United Kingdom judgment of 15 November 1996, Reports
1996-VI, pp. 1869-70, § 145 ( NJ 1997, 301, m.nt. PJB; red.)).
However, such a remedy is only required in respect of grievances which can be
regarded as "arguable" in terms of the Convention.
65. The Court observes that Ms Halford undoubtedly had an "arguable" claim that
calls made from her office telephones were intercepted and that this amounted to
a violation of Article 8 of the Convention (see paragraphs 42-51 above). She
was, therefore, entitled to an effective domestic remedy within the meaning of
Article 13. However, as the Government have conceded in relation to Article 8 of
the Convention (see paragraph 50 above), there was no provision in domestic law
to regulate interceptions of telephone calls made on internal communications
systems operated by public authorities, such as the Merseyside Police. The
applicant was therefore unable to seek relief at national level in relation to
her complaint concerning her office telephones.
It follows that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention in
relation to the applicant's office telephones.
B. The home telephone
66. The applicant also complained that there was no remedy available to her
against an interception of telephone calls made from her home by the police
acting without a warrant. She referred to the first report of the Commissioner
appointed under the 1985 Act who observed that he "was not concerned with (the
offence of unlawful interception created by the 1985 Act. He could) not in the
nature of things know, nor could he well find out, whether there (had) been an
unlawful interception ... . That is a job for the police" (Interception of
Communications Act 1985, Report of the Commissioner for 1986, Cm 108, p. 2, §
3).
67. The Government submitted that Ms Halford had not established an arguable
claim of a violation of the Convention in relation to the interception of calls
made from her home. In the alternative, they submitted that the aggregate of
remedies available to her, including those provided by the 1985 Act, was
sufficient to satisfy Article 13.
68. The Commission, in view of its conclusion as to the lack of a reasonable
likelihood of interception of her home telephone calls, considered that she did
not have an arguable claim warranting a remedy under Article 13.
69. The Court recalls its observation that, in order to find an "interference"
within the meaning of Article 8 in relation to Ms Halford's home telephone, it
must be satisfied that there was a reasonable likelihood of some measure of
surveillance having been applied to the applicant (see paragraph 57 above). It
refers in addition to its assessment of the evidence adduced by the applicant in
support of her claim that calls made from her home telephone were intercepted
(see paragraphs 58-60 above).
70. The Court considers that this evidence is not sufficient to found an
"arguable" claim within the meaning of Article 13 (see paragraph 64 above).
It follows that there has been no violation of Article 13 of the Convention in
relation to the applicants's complaint concerning her home telephone.
III. Alleged violation of Articles 10 and 14 of the Convention
71. In her application to the Commission, Ms Halford had complained that the
interception of calls made from both her home and office telephones amounted to
violations of Articles 10 and 14 of the Convention. However, before the Court
she accepted that it might not be necessary to examine, in relation to these
provisions, matters which had already been considered under Article 8.
Article 10 of the Convention states (as far as relevant):
    "1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
    include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and
    ideas without interference by public authorithy and regardless of frontiers.
    ...
    2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
    responsibilities, may by subject to such formalities, conditions,
    restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
    democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial
    integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
    protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or
    rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in
    confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
    judiciary."
Article 14 states:
    "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention shall
    be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour,
    language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
    association with a national minority, property, birth or other status."
72. The Court considers that the allegations in relation to Articles 10 and 14
are tantamount to restatements of the complaints under Article 8. It does not
therefore find it necessary to examine them separately.
IV. Application of Article 50 of the Convention
73. Ms Halford asked the Court to grant her just satisfaction under Article 50
of the Convention, which provides as follows:
    "If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a legal authority
    or any other authority of a High Contracting Party is completely or
    partially in conflict with the obligations arising from the ... Convention,
    and if the internal law of the said Party allows only partial reparation to
    be made for the consequences of this decision or measure, the decision of
    the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured
    party."
A. Non-pecuniary loss
74. Ms Halford claimed compensation for the intrusion into her privacy and the
distress it had caused. She informed the Court that in 1992 she had required
medical treatment for stress.
75. The Government commented that no causal connection had been established
between the stress suffered by the applicant at the time of proceedings before
the Industrial Tribunal and the interception of her telephone calls.
76. The Court, bearing in mind that the interception of calls made by Ms Halford
on her office telephones at Merseyside Police Headquarters, not subject to any
regulation by domestic law, appears to have been carried out by the police with
the primary purpose of gathering material to be used against her in sex
discrimination proceedings, considers what occurred to have amounted to a
serious infringement of her rights by those concerned. On the other hand, there
is no evidence to suggest that the stress Ms Halford suffered was directly
attributable to the interception of her calls, rather than to her other
conflicts with the Merseyside Police.
Having taken these matters into account, the Court considers that £ 10 000 is a
just and equitable amount of compensation.
B. Pecuniary loss
77. Ms Halford requested reimbursement of her personal expenses incurred in
bringing the Strasbourg proceedings, estimated at between £ 1000 and £ 1250.
78. The Government accepted that a sum could properly be awarded to cover her
costs in attending the hearing before the Court. However, they observed that she
had not produced any evidence to substantiate any other expenses.
79. In view of the fact that no evidence was produced to substantiate Ms
Halford's expenses but that she clearly attended the hearing in Strasbourg, the
Court decides to award £ 600 in respect of this item.
C. Legal costs and expenses
80. The applicant also claimed the costs and expenses of instructing solicitors
and Counsel. Her solicitors asked for payment at the rate of £ 239 per hour.
They estimated that they had undertaken the equivalent of 500 hours' work in
connection with the Strasbourg proceedings and asked for £ 119 500 (exclusive of
value added tax, "VAT") in respect of this. In addition, they asked for £ 7500
(exclusive of VAT) in respect of disbursements and expenses. Counsel's fees were
£ 14 875 plus expenses of £ 1000 (exclusive of VAT).
81. The Government considered that the hourly rate requested by Ms Halford's
solicitors was too high: in domestic proceedings the appropriate rate would be £
120-£ 150 per hour. Furthermore, they submitted that it had not been necessary
to work for 500 hours on the case. By way of illustration, they observed that,
although the case involved only a narrow range of issues, the applicant's
solicitor had chosen to submit written pleadings of approximately 200 pages,
with some 500 pages of annexes and appendices, containing for the most part
information which was either irrelevant or of only peripheral relevance. They
submitted that a total figure for legal costs of approximately £ 25 000 would be
entirely sufficient.
82. Bearing in mind the nature of the issues raised by the case, the Court is
not satisfied that the amounts claimed by the applicant were necessarily
incurred or reasonable as to quantum (see, for example, the Saunders v. the
United Kingdom judgment of 17 December 1996, Reports 1996-VI, p. 2070, § 93 (NJ
1997, 699, m.nt. Kn; red.)). Deciding on an equitable basis, it awards £ 25 000
under this head, together with any VAT which may be chargeable.
D. Default interest
83. According to the information available to the Court, the statutory rate of
interest applicable in the United Kingdom at the date of adoption of the present
judgment is 8% per annum.
For these reasons, the Court
1. Holds unanimously that Article 8 of the Convention is applicable to the
complaints concerning both the office and the home telephones;
2. Holds unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 8 in relation to
calls made on the applicant's office telephones;
3. Holds unanimously that there was no violation of Article 8 in relation to
calls made on the applicant's home telephone;
4. Holds unanimously that there was a violation of Article 13 of the Convention
in relation to the applicant's complaint concerning her office telephones;
5. Holds by eight votes to one that there was no violation of Article 13 of the
Convention in relation to the applicant's complaint concerning her home
telephone;
6. Holds unanimously that it is not necessary to consider the complaints under
Articles 10 and 14 of the Convention;
7. Holds unanimously
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, in
respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, £ 10 600 (ten thousand six
hundred pounds sterling);
(b) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, in
respect of costs and expenses, £ 25 000 (twenty-five thousand pounds sterling),
together with any VAT which may be chargeable;
(c) that simple interest at an annual rate of 8% shall be payable from the
expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement.
Dissenting opinion of judge Russo
I disagree with the Court's conclusion that there was no violation of Article 13
of the Convention in relation to the applicant's complaint that calls made from
her home telephone were intercepted.
Although I agree that no interference with her Article 8 rights was established
with regard to her home telephone, I observe that her complaint in this
connection was declared admissible by the Commission and examined by the
Commission and the Court. In my view, it cannot therefore be said that she did
not have an "arguable" claim of a violation of Article 8 in respect of her home
telephone (see, for example, the Leander v. Sweden judgment of 26 March 1987,
Series A no. 116, p. 30, § 79).
It follows that Ms Halford was entitled to an effective remedy at national level
in respect of this complaint. I am not satisfied that she was provided with one.

Noot:
1. In dit arrest wordt de belangrijke uitspraak van het Niemietz-arrest, dat het
recht op privacy zich tot op zekere hoogte ook uitstrekt tot de werkplek,
bevestigd. Het Hof overwoog in dat arrest onder meer het volgende:
"The Court does not consider it possible or necessary to attempt an exhaustive
definition of the notion of "private life". However, it would be too restrictive
to limit the notion to an "inner circle" in which the individual may live his
own personal life as he chooses and to exclude therefrom entirely the outside
world not encompassed within that circle. Respect for private life must also
comprise to a certain degree the right to establish and develop relationships
with other human beings.
There appears, furthermore, to be no reason of principle why this understanding
of the notion of "private life" should be taken to exclude activities of a
professional or business nature since it is, after all, in the course of their
working lives that the majority of people have a significant, if not the
greatest, opportunity of developing relationships with the outside world. This
view is supported by the fact that, as was rightly pointed out by the
Commission, it is not always possible to distinguish clearly which of an
individual's activities form part of his professional or business life and which
do not. Thus, especially in the case of a person exercising a liberal
profession, his work in that context may form part and parcel of his life to
such a degree that it becomes impossible to know in what capacity he is acting
at a given moment of time."
(EHRM 16 december 1992, NJ 1993, 400, r.o. 29).
2. Evenmin als in het Niemietz-arrest speelt in de thans te bespreken uitspraak
het probleem van de zogenaamde horizontale werking van grondrechten een rol. In
de Niemietz-zaak speelde dat probleem niet, omdat daar overheidsoptreden in het
kader van de strafvordering aan de orde was (huiszoeking op een advocatenkantoor
in het kader van een gerechtelijk vooronderzoek). In de zaak-Halford speelt het
probleem niet, omdat de werkgever een overheidsinstantie is.
3. Het is niet de eerste keer dat het Hof zich moest buigen over het afluisteren
van telefoons in het Verenigd Koninkrijk. Al in 1984 bepaalde het Hof in het
Malone-arrest dat de in Engeland en Wales gevolgde regels over het aftappen van
telefoongesprekken niet voldeden aan de eisen van "accessibility" en
"foreseeability". (Over Schotland en Noord-Ierland werd niet gerept.) Deze vorm
van inmenging in het privé-leven kon daarom niet geacht worden "in accordance
with the law" te zijn, zoals art. 8 lid 2 EVRM vereist (EHRM 2 augustus 1984, NJ
1988, 534). Zie ook EHRM 26 april 1979, NJ 1980, 146 (Sunday Times).
Als gevolg van deze uitspraak kwam in 1985 de Interception of Communications Act
tot stand. Deze wet is echter alleen op het openbare telefoonnet van toepassing
en niet op een intern systeem zoals dat in casu (mede) in het geding was. Ook de
"common law" biedt ten aanzien van deze materie geen enkel soelaas.
De juridische situatie met betrekking tot dergelijke interne telefoonnetten is
vanuit grondrechtelijk oogpunt zelfs nog ongunstiger dan de situatie zoals die
voor 1985 in Engeland en Wales bestond voor wat betreft het openbare
telefoonnet. Toen was in elk geval sprake van zekere regels en procedures, al
voldeden die in onvoldoende mate aan de eisen van "accessibility" en
"foreseeability" om als "law" te kunnen worden aangemerkt. In de zaak-Halford is
er echter geen sprake van welke regeling dan ook.
4. In het hier aan de orde zijnde geval werd de in het Niemietz-arrest erkende
"werkplek-privacy" nog door bijkomende factoren versterkt. Mevr. Halford
beschikte op haar kantoor namelijk over twee telefoontoestellen, waarvan er één
was bestemd voor privé-gebruik. Bovendien had zij uitdrukkelijk toestemming
gekregen om zich in werktijd, ook per telefoon, bezig te houden met de procedure
over sexe-discriminatie die zij had aangespannen.
De uitkomst van de procedure in Straatsburg is, nu het afluisteren van de
telefoons op de werkplek aannemelijk werd geacht, dan ook niet verbazingwekkend.
Van deze onmiskenbare inmenging in de privacy van mevr. Halford kon immers
onmogelijk worden gezegd, dat deze "in accordance with the law" was, nu zoals
uit de vorige paragraaf van deze noot bleek elke regeling op dit punt ontbrak.
5. Zie voor een samenvatting van de jurisprudentie van het EHRM over (onder
meer) het afluisteren van telefoongesprekken in relatie tot art. 8 EVRM J.A.
Hofman, Vertrouwelijke communicatie, Deventer, 1995, p. 65-83.
PJB